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Abstract
We use a simulation model to study how the diversiﬁcation of electricity generation port-
folios inﬂuences wholesale prices. We ﬁnd that technological diversiﬁcation generally leads
to lower market prices but that the relationship is mediated by the supply to demand ratio.
In each demand case there is a threshold where pivotal dynamics change. Pivotal dynamics
pre- and post-threshold are the cause of non-linearities in the inﬂuence of diversiﬁcation on
market prices. The ﬁndings are robust to our choice of behavioural parameters and match
close-form solutions where those are available.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Electricity is a non-storable, undiﬀerentiated commodity, delivered into a market with low de-
mand elasticity, high security of supply requirements and wide seasonal variations. As a result,
the industry accommodates a wide range of generating technologies, and ﬁrms own not one but
several plants. Some generators are technologically diversiﬁed and own nuclear plants on the
base-load as well as high-cost thermal units. For example PG & E, a large US utility, owns
hydro, nuclear, thermal and renewable plants (PG & E Corporation, 2006). Others are special-
ists, focusing on only one technology. Until recently, British Energy’s generation portfolio was
formed exclusively by eight nuclear generating units (British Energy, 2006).1
The eﬀect of technological diversiﬁcation on prices is an important question in industries with
undiﬀerentiated output but diﬀerent production technologies. A market in which generators are
specialised could exhibit more market power because the price-setting part of the merit order
is more concentrated. However, in electricity pools, specialised high-cost generators have less
incentives to exert market power because they lack base-load plants to reap the beneﬁts. In
contrast, diversiﬁed ﬁrms have incentives to use their high-cost plants to increase market prices
and thereby increase the proﬁt on the base-load, but may not have enough price-setting capacity
to do so.
In this paper, we address the general questions of “what is the shape of the diversiﬁcation to
prices relationship?” and “what are its determinants?”. Speciﬁcally, we study diﬀerent markets
where a generation duopoly own varying amounts of base- and peak-load capacity that is bundled
into a high- and a low- cost plant. In order to isolate the portfolio eﬀects, we keep market
concentration constant, as well as the market base-load and high-cost capacities. Our trading
environment is a multi-unit, compulsory, uniform-price auction. This set-up, however, is often
characterised by the presence of a manifold of non-Pareto ranked Nash equilibria (von der Fehr
and Harbord, 1993). To achieve predictions, we use an inductive selection method based on the
adaptive theory of reinforcement learning put forward by Roth and Erev (1995).2
Our main policy ﬁndings are that more diversiﬁcation often leads to lower market prices.
This relationship, however, is non-monotonic and mediated by the market excess capacity. For
each demand to supply ratio, we identify a diversiﬁcation breaking point, estimated from the
simulations, where dynamics change. Up to the breaking point, more intense competition due to
1British Energy has recently started to operate one coal-ﬁred plant.
2Papers which also use the Roth and Erev method in the electricity context include Nicolaisen et al. (2001),
Rupérez Micola and Bunn (forthcoming) and Rupérez Micola et al. (forthcoming).
2higher diversiﬁcation always leads to lower prices. In low-demand situations, prices drop further
after the breaking point. In high-demand cases, instead, further diversiﬁcation leads to higher
prices, but prices remain lower or equal to those under perfect specialisation.
We show that the non-monotonic diversiﬁcation/prices relationship is caused by regime
changes in the ﬁrms’ incentives and market power. Interestingly, the estimated breaking points
are shown to (statistically) match the theoretically predicted thresholds at which the number of
“pivotal” plants change.3 In our setup, there is always one and only one pivotal plant under little
or no diversiﬁcation. After the threshold, the number of pivotal plants changes. In low demand
situations, the market moves from one to no pivotal plants, which results in further competitive
pressures. In high demand cases, there are two peak-load pivotal plants post-threshold, which
leads to some implicit coordination and higher prices.
In spite of its importance, the literature on generation portfolios as a source of market power
is relatively sparse. Arellano and Serra (2005) show how, in cases where a regulator uses peak-
load marginal costs to determine wholesale prices, generators can exercise market power by
increasing the share of peak technology in their portfolio. They conclude that market power
in this context should not be measured by the traditional price-cost margin or concentration
measures, but by the distortion in the composition of the generating portfolio due to regulatory
incentives. Bushnell (2003) uses a Cournot model to analyse competition among several ﬁrms
when each possesses some hydroelectric and thermal generation resources. He concludes that
ﬁrms may ﬁnd it proﬁt a b l et oa l l o c a t em o r eh y d r op r o d u c t i o nt oo ﬀ-peak periods than they
would under perfect competition, or if they did not act strategically. Garcia et al. (2005)
analyse the price-formation process in an inﬁnite-horizon model where hydroelectric generators
engage in dynamic price-based competition and show how simulations with a basic learning
algorithm converge to the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Bunn and Oliveira (2007) also use a
simulation to model the interaction between an electricity market and a plant swapping game.
They identify a symbiotic interaction between the two markets: initial situations where ﬁrms are
perfectly diversiﬁed evolve, via plant trading, into lower electricity prices than those in which
ﬁrms were originally specialised.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Part 2, we describe the model and
simulation procedure. The results are presented in Part 3 and we conclude with a short discussion
in Part 4.
3A plant is pivotal if the quantity demanded exceeds the sum of production capacities of all other plants and,
as a result, the plant is necessary to fulﬁll demand.
32 Model and Simulation Procedure
2.1 Market structure
Our model incorporates key features of electricity markets in the short run. Two companies that
compete for the supply of the market own a mix of low (e.g. nuclear) and high (e.g. thermal)
marginal cost capacity.4 Denoting the generating companies as 1 and 2 and the overall market
capacity as K, the capacities of their respective low (l) and high (h)c o s tp l a n t sa r e
kl
1 = kh
2 =( 1− α)K/2 and kh
1 = kl
2 = αK/2,
where α ∈]0,0.5[ represents the degree of portfolio diversiﬁcation. In the case of specialisation
(α =0 ), company 1 is a low-cost specialist and company 2 is specialised in the high-cost tech-
nology. Portfolio diversiﬁcation grows with α, a growing proportion of the base-load generator’s
capacity is exogeneously replaced with high-cost units. Symmetrically, the generator’s high-cost
capacity is replaced with base-load. In the case of full diversiﬁcation (α =0 .5), each company
holds the same amount of low- and high-cost generating capacity. This formulation isolates the
eﬀects of portfolio diversiﬁcation because, while allowing for diﬀerent degrees of diversiﬁcation,
the total capacity of each company is kept constant,
kl
i + kh
i = K/2 for i =1 ,2,





2 = K/2 for j = l,h.
Marginal costs are assumed to be constant; normalised to 0 for the low-cost plants and equal to c
for the high-cost plants, and there are no grid constraints.5 Although relevant in the long term,
we do not deal with entry and exit of ﬁrms, capacity expansion, the use of long-term contracts
(as in e.g. Baldick et al., 2006), ancillary and capacity payments.
4The model could be easily extended to other more realistic market conﬁgurations, including all sorts of
oligopolies and the existence of a competitive fringe. However, our analysis in a stylised market is more transparent
and comparable to previous literature.
5The addition of network constraints would undoubtedly make the analysis richer but it would also make it
more complicated to dissentangle eﬀects due exclusively to technology diversiﬁcation from those arising from local
market power exerted by relatively small players.
42.2 Market rules
Trading takes place through a multi-unit, compulsory, uniform-price auction. Suppliers submit
simultaneous single-price bids at which they are willing to sell up to the capacity of each plant.
Each ﬁrm, thus, submits a piecewise “step” supply function.6 Possible bids are bounded between
marginal costs and Ψ,w i t hΨ being the maximum “reasonable” price.7
We model the market demand Q as fully inelastic,8 drawn from a uniform distribution in the
interval [ ¯ Q − ε, ¯ Q + ε], where ¯ Q is its expected value and ε accounts for the small uncertainty
typical in day-ahead forecasting.9 We assume that there is always some system overcapacity,
¯ Q+ε<K , but demand always exceeds the market aggregate of low-cost capacity, ¯ Q−ε>K / 2,
consistent with the normal operations of many de-regulated energy markets.10
An independent auctioneer determines the uniform market price P by intersecting the ad




i, to the M
plants with bids below the market price; the remaining capacity, q
j





plant with a bid equal to the market price;11 and zero sales, q
j
i =0 , to those bidding above the
market price. Proﬁts for each company are
πi = Pq l
i +[ P − c] qh
i for i =1 ,2. (1)
2.3 Multiple equilibria and inductive selection
This trading setting often presents a manifold of non-Pareto ranked Nash equilibria (von der Fehr
and Harbord, 1993; Crawford et al., 2006). For example, if there is full diversiﬁcation, having
one generator bidding the maximum price for the high-cost unit, while the other generator bids
at marginal cost, is part of an equilibrium if demand is relatively high.
Proposition 1 Assume that generators are diversiﬁed (α =0 .5) and the expected demand is
high, ¯ Q>3/4. Then, there is a manifold of non-Pareto ranked Nash equilibria.
6Piecewise supply functions have been introduced, among others, by Hobbs and Pang (2007).
7This upper price ceiling can be understood as a limit triggering regulatory intervention or the cost of alter-
native, expensive, load fuels to which the system administrator could switch at short notice if prices exceed Ψ.I t
also reﬂects high cost back-up power generation facilities owned by many industrial users.
8The literature has established the extremely low price elasticity of short-term electricity demand, originating,
among others, from the lack of real-time metering systems (e.g. Stoft, 2002).
9The small uncertainty is introduced for the sake of realism, but its absence would not alter our ﬁndings.
10For example, the UK energy system includes a reserve margin of about 20% of expected peak demand.
11In case of a tie, the selling plant is selected randomly.
5Proof. Since the two ﬁrms are symmetric, denote the price-setting ﬁrm as Firm 1. We are going




2)=( 0 ,0,Ψ,b) is a Nash equilibrium for c ≤ b<b b,w h e r eb b will be
deﬁned below. If bl
1 = bl
2 =0 , bh
1 = Ψ and bh
2 < Ψ then P = Ψ and π1 = Ψ K/4+[ Ψ − c]
( ¯ Q − 3/4K) and π2 = Ψ K/4+[ Ψ − c] K/4. The strategy of Firm 2 is clearly a best response
to the strategy of Firm 1 because both quantity and market price are the maximum possible.
Setting bl
1 = e b ≥ b = bh
1 cannot yield higher payoﬀsf o rF i r m1t h a ni fbh
1 = e b and bh
1 = b. Then,
by setting bl
1 =0 ,F i r m1h a sn oi n ﬂuence in the payoﬀs. Finally, setting bh
1 = Ψ is a best
response as long as









2 < b b =
Ψ
¡ ¯ Q − K/2
¢
+ c(K − ¯ Q)
K/2
.
One can easily check that c<b b<Ψ.
Standard comparative statics analyses rely on the Nash speciﬁcation to determine the so-
lution. Hence, multiple equilibria make it diﬃcult to come up with an answer to our research
question, which should be based on a comparative statics exercise with respect to the degree of
diversiﬁcation.
In equilibrium multiplicity cases, a selection method is necessary to choose amongst them.
In broad terms, there are two schools of thought in the area of equilibrium selection (Haruvy
and Stahl, 2004). On the one hand, we have deductive selection — based on reasoning and
coordination in focal points — and, on the other hand, we have inductive selection — based
on adaptive dynamics. Until recently, deductive principles have dominated the equilibrium
selection literature. Existing deductive mechanisms, however, have been shown to do poorly
in experiments (see e.g. Van Huyck et al., 1990). Simple adaptive learning dynamics, instead,
often yield good equilibrium predictions (see e.g. Roth and Erev, 1995).
Reinforcement models are widely used adaptive learning mechanisms (see e.g. Nicolaisen et
al., 2001, Rupérez Micola and Bunn, 2007, Rupérez Micola et al., 2007, and Veit et al., 2006).
They are based on the law of eﬀect, whereby actions that result in positive consequences are
more likely to be repeated in the future while those that result in negative consequences are
less likely to be replayed. One of the main strengths of reinforcement models is that one does
not need to make assumptions on the information that players have about strategies, history of
play and payoﬀ structure of the other players. This is especially useful to model very volatile
markets such as wholesale electricity.
62.4 Behavioural learning
In order to model learning, we adopt in particular the well-known and practical-to-implement
reinforcement learning method put forward by Roth and Erev (1995) —denoted as R-E. The
previously described bidding competition is repeated for a ﬁnite number of periods. Behavioural
learning takes place by repeating the following three steps in each period.
STEP 1: Generators submit price oﬀers for each plant according to a plant-speciﬁcp r o b a b i l i t y
distribution over the set of possible bids.
For simplicity, the feasible price oﬀer domain for each plant is approximated by a discrete
grid. For each plant, generators choose among S possible prices, equally spaced between the
minimum and the maximum price oﬀe r . T h a ti s ,t h es e t so fp o s s i b l eb i d sf o rt h el o w -a n d
high-cost plants, Bl and Bh, range from 0 and c,12 respectively, up to Ψ,
Bl = {s(Ψ/S)| s =1 ,...,S}, (2)
Bh = {c + s(Ψ − c)/S | s =1 ,...,S}. (3)
Each bid is generated by an “action s”. Bids generated from lower actions are more competitive,
i.e. closer to marginal costs.
In each round t, each generator i selects an action s for plant j with a likelihood or “propen-
sity” r
j
i,s(t). The probability of an action being played is given by its propensity divided by the

















i, so that all actions have the same initial probability, p
j
i,s(1) = 1
S for all s, i and j.
STEP 2: The auctioneer determines the market price by intersecting the ad hoc supply
function with the realised demand.
As explained above, the auctioneer determines the price and the individual quantities by
intersecting the ad hoc supply function with the realised demand, which is assumed to be
independently distributed across periods. Subsequently, the price and the individual quantities
are communicated independently to each generator.
12An alternative is to allow expensive plants to bid below c so that they have to ﬁnd out for themselves that
this is not proﬁtable. This slows the learning process down but does not alter our results. Thus, as most of the
electricity simulation literature, we do not allow ﬁrms to bid below marginal costs.
7STEP 3: Each plant-speciﬁc probability distribution is adjusted based on the performance of
the bid used.
At the end of each round, plants reinforce the selected action, a, through an increase in its
propensity that is equivalent to the performance of the company as a whole, πi(t).A c t i o n st h a t
are similar, i.e. a−1 and a+1, are also reinforced but to a lesser extent, precisely by (1−δ)πi(t)
where 0 <δ<1 (“persistent local experimentation” in the terminology of R-E). All propensities
are discounted by γ (“gradual forgetting”) and actions whose probability falls below a certain
threshold are removed from the space of choice (“extinction in ﬁnite time”). The pre-extinction









(1 − γ) r
j
i,s(t)+πi(t) if s = a
(1 − γ) r
j
i,s(t)+( 1− δ) πi(t) if s = a − 1 or s = a +1
(1 − γ) r
j
i,s(t) if s 6= a − 1,s 6= a and s 6= a +1 ,














where I is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the condition between brackets is satisﬁed
and zero otherwise.
These three steps are repeated for a ﬁnite number of periods T. Although generators reﬁne
their strategies through learning, there always remains some degree of uncertainty. We therefore
perform many simulation runs and we deﬁne convergence in terms of the across-run average
standard deviation of prices. We require the ﬁnite number of periods T to be such that the
initial average standard deviation is reduced below a given threshold. Our simulations produce
a large dataset, which is described in the following subsection, and analysed econometrically in
the subsequent section.
2.5 Simulation parameters and dataset
The end-user reasonable price ceiling is set at Ψ = 200, with a discrete grid of S = 100 possible
prices. Total capacity is set to K = 300, so that each generator’s capacity is K/2 = 150.
Marginal costs for the high-cost plants are c = 100 and zero for the low-cost plants.
We perform simulations for a discrete grid of fourteen expected demand cases, ¯ Q = {160,
170..., 290}, corresponding to market expected excess capacity of 46.66% through 3.33%,w i t h
a small uncertainty (ε =5 ). If, for example, ¯ Q = 240 then Q ∼ U[235,245]. For each instance,
8we consider ﬁfty one diversiﬁcation levels, α = {0,. 01,. 02,. . . ,. 50}. Further, we check the
robustness of the analysis to changes in R-E parameters by taking nine combinations of the
learning parameters, γ = {0.0025,0.005,0.0075} and δ = {0.25, 0.50, 0.75},w i t hμ =0 .0005
throughout.
For each speciﬁcation, we have performed ﬁfty simulation runs. We consider that convergence
is attained if the average standard deviation is reduced by 1/4. This occurs around period 200.
We allow each simulation to run for 500 periods.13 We then build a dataset consisting of average
prices for the last 200 periods (301 to 500), for each simulation run, α, ¯ Q, γ and δ.14 Our dataset
includes 50 × 51 × 14 × 3 × 3 = 321,300 observations. As representative cases, we focus on the
demand cases of ¯ Q = {240,180 and 280}, with expected excess capacities of 20%, 40% and 6.66%,
respectively. In those examples, we approximate power systems under normal operations, spare
and tight capacity conditions.
As a robustness check, we have run additional simulations for ¯ Q = 100 and ¯ Q = 300 (for
various speciﬁcations of the other parameters), where von der Fehr and Harbord’s (1993) price
predictions would be unique and equal to 0 and 200, respectively. Simulated prices evolve in the
direction of their prediction and the 95% conﬁdence intervals of observed prices include in both
cases the predicted prices.15
3R e s u l t s
3.1 Diversiﬁcation/prices relationship
Table 1 summarises the relationship between α and stationary market prices, with ¯ Q as a
covariate, and ﬁxed eﬀects for δ and γ. The results show a positive relationship between demand
and prices, as expected. The relationship between the diversiﬁcation parameter, α,a n dm a r k e t
prices is negative and strongly signiﬁcative. Diversiﬁcation leads to lower market prices. The
inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects suggests that, overall, the results are robust to the R-E parameter
speciﬁcations.16
13For each speciﬁcation, the one-lag with trend Augmented Dickey-Fuller test-statistic for the price series is
lower than -10. Given that the 95% critical value is -3.43, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is always rejected.
14Increasing substantially the length of the simulation, e.g. to 1,000 periods and using the averages between
801 and 1,000, did not change the nature of our results.
15Figures are available upon request from the authors.
16Figures with average prices under each R-E speciﬁcation are available from the authors. Both the positive
demand-to-prices and negative diversiﬁcation-to-prices eﬀects are clear. The ﬁgures are also remarkably similar,
9Table 1: Parameter estimates diversiﬁcation, demand and prices




¯ Q 0.2343 347.33
R2 49 %
However, the idea that diversiﬁcation always leads to lower prices is too naive. To see
why, Figures 1-3 present the mean price as a function of portfolio diversiﬁcation for the three
representative cases, ¯ Q = {240,180 and 280} (with γ =0 .005 and δ =0 .50). In all ﬁgures when
α =0 ,o n eﬁrm is exclusively on the base-load and the other on the peak-load. Remember
that portfolio diversiﬁcation grows with α, as a growing proportion of the base-load generator’s
capacity is replaced with high-cost units, and vice-versa, the generator’s high-cost capacity is
increasingly replaced with base-load. At the other end, when α =0 .50,b o t hﬁrms own one half of
each technology. Besides the mean price, we also represent the set of prices within two standard
deviations from the mean, corresponding approximately to the 95% conﬁdence intervals.
In Figure 1 ( ¯ Q =2 4 0 ), prices start from a mean of 169.3 and are reduced very slightly as the
two ﬁrms’ portfolios become more balanced. When α =0 .40, the price is 168.1, and increases
thereafter, to 173.7. Portfolio diversiﬁcation seems to have a small downward price eﬀect before
α =0 .40, but a clear upward eﬀect occurs thereafter. Figures 2 ( ¯ Q = 180)a n d3(¯ Q =2 8 0 )
reinforce the view of demand, or its analogue “excess capacity”, mediating on the inﬂuence of
portfolio diversiﬁcation. In the spare capacity situation, Figure 2, prices are lower than in the
baseline case, with an average specialization price of 157.6. The relationship between prices and
diversiﬁcation is also diﬀerent, ﬂat until α =0 .17, where prices start to decrease markedly. The
end of the decrease is at α =0 .23, with average price 145.2, which remains stable for further
diversiﬁcation cases. Prices are higher in the tight capacity situation (Figure 3) but they seem
to follow a similar pattern to the baseline case. They start at 175.7 and stay ﬂat until around
α =0 .15, where there is an increase to about 179.2.B e y o n dα =0 .15, prices are ﬂat once again,
albeit at the higher level.
which suggest that the qualitative nature of the results is not aﬀected by the choice of R-E parameters, at least
within our ranges.
10Taken together, Table 1 and Figures 1 to 3 suggest that the shape of the portfolio diver-
siﬁcation to market prices relationship is generally decreasing, with two caveats. First, the
relationship is not monotonic and second, there is a signiﬁcant variation in its shape, depending
on ¯ Q. Structural breaks occur for α =0 .40 for ¯ Q = 240, between α =0 .17 and α =0 .23 for
¯ Q = 180 and α =0 .14 for ¯ Q = 280. We hence obtain three preliminary stylised facts regarding
the diversiﬁcation to prices relationship:
1. Diversiﬁcation leads to lower prices in general;
2. The market demand inﬂuences both absolute price levels and the shape of the diversiﬁ-
cation to prices relationship;
3. The diversiﬁcation to prices relationship is not monotonic but seems to present structural
stability breaks.
In the remainder of the paper, we further explore those ﬁndings. We ﬁrst show that the
diversiﬁcation/prices relationship presents non-linearities in all demand cases.
3.2 Structural breaking points and market prices
For each demand and R-E combination, we estimate a simple piecewise linear model between the
l e v e lo fd i v e r s i ﬁcation and the prices, using dummy variables. The model is uniquely speciﬁed
by the choice of some threshold value αv,
Pi = β0 + β1Di + β2αi + β3Diαi + ui, (6)
where Di =0if αi <α v,a n dDi =1when αi ≥ αv. That is, pre- and post- breaking point
regression estimates are speciﬁed, respectively, by
E(Pi|Di =0 ,α i)=β0 + β2αi and E(Pi|Di =1 ,α i)=( β0 + β1)+( β2 + β3)αi.
The simulated breaking point is then deﬁned as the threshold value that generates the best-ﬁt
regression.
Deﬁnition 2 A structural breaking point c αv satisﬁes F(c αv) ≥ F(αv) for any threshold αv,
where F(αv) denotes the F-statistic obtained from a piecewise linear regression with threshold
αv.
Figure 4 provides the estimated relationship between diversiﬁcation and prices of the best-ﬁt
regression, for each demand and R-E combination. Each line corresponds to an R-E parameter
combination and each panel corresponds to a diﬀerent demand speciﬁcation. If 160 ≤ ¯ Q ≤ 220
11(low demand) the negative price eﬀects of diversiﬁcation are strengthened at the breaking point.
If demand is intermediate, ¯ Q = {230,240,250}, there are positive price eﬀects at the breaking
points, which continue until full diversiﬁcation. If demand is large, ¯ Q = {260,270,280,290},
there is little excess capacity and prices are already approaching the simulation’s maximum
price. Under those conditions, the breaking point coincides with large price jumps followed by
ﬂat diversiﬁcation/prices relationships.
These results suggest that:
4. The dynamics pre- and post-breaking point are responsible for the nonlinearities in the
inﬂuence of diversiﬁcation on market prices;
5. In spare capacity cases (i.e. ¯ Q = {160,...220}) prices drop at the breaking point;
6. When capacity is tight (i.e. ¯ Q = {230,...290}), on the other hand, prices increase at the
breaking point.
3.3 Pivotal regime switching point: theory and simulation
In this section, we explore further the non-linearities. We show that the simulated structural
breaks coincide with pivotal regime switching points (e.g. Genc and Reynolds, 2005; Entriken
and Wan, 2005; Perekhodtsev et al., 2002). We also show how those depend on the industry’s
excess capacity.
Deﬁnition 3 A high-cost plant is pivotal if the quantity demanded exceeds the sum of production
capacities of all other plants. A level of diversiﬁcation αt is a switching point if the number of
pivotal plants for α<α t is diﬀerent than that for α ≥ αt.
For example, when ¯ Q = 240 we have that αt =0 .40 because the number of pivotal plants




1 < 240 and kl
1+kl
2+kh
2 > 240.On the other hand if α>0.40 both peak-
load plants are pivotal because kl
1 +kl
2 +kh
1 < 240 and kl
1 +kl
2 +kh
2 < 240.Similarly, if ¯ Q = 280,
there is a switching point at αt =0 .13, where the number of pivotal plants increases from one
to two. In contrast, if ¯ Q = 180, the number of pivotal plants is reduced from one to none at
the switching point, which is αt =0 .20. More generally, the level of excess capacity generates




2) to identify the
pivotal regime changes under each ¯ Q assumption. The closed-form values are presented in the
following proposition.
12Proposition 4 (a) If K/2 < ¯ Q ≤ 3K/4, the switching point is αt =( 2¯ Q−K)/K,a tw h i c ht h e
number of pivotal plants is reduced from one to none.
(b) If 3K/4 < ¯ Q ≤ K, the switching point is αt =2 ( K − ¯ Q)/K, at which the number of pivotal
plants is increased from one to two.
Table 2 summarises the switching point for each demand level, together with the capacities
of each plant at this level and the number of pivotal plants before and after the threshold.
Table 2: Pivotal regime change thresholds as a function of demand ( ¯ Q).
Capacities at α = αt No pivotal




2 α<α t α ≥ αt
300 160 0.07 140 10 10 140 1 0
300 170 0.13 130 20 20 130 1 0
300 180 0.20 120 30 30 120 1 0
300 190 0.27 110 40 40 110 1 0
300 200 0.33 100 50 50 100 1 0
300 210 0.40 90 60 60 90 1 0
300 220 0.47 80 70 70 80 1 0
300 230 0.47 80 70 70 80 1 2
300 240 0.40 90 60 60 90 1 2
300 250 0.33 100 50 50 100 1 2
300 260 0.27 110 40 40 110 1 2
300 270 0.20 120 30 30 120 1 2
300 280 0.13 130 20 20 130 1 2
300 290 0.07 140 10 10 140 1 2
That leads to the following stylised facts:
7. For each demand assumption, there is a switching point where the number of pivotal
plants changes;
8. Within our parameter boundaries, there is always one pivotal plant before the switching
point;
9. In relative spare capacity cases (i.e. ¯ Q = {160,...220}) there are no pivotal plants after
the switching point;
1310. When capacity is relatively tight (i.e. ¯ Q = {230,...290}), there are two pivotal plants
after the switching point.
Notice that the theoretical pivotal switching points for ¯ Q = 240, ¯ Q =1 8 0and ¯ Q = 280 are
visually close to the structural regime change thresholds in the diversiﬁcation/prices relationships
of Figures 1 to 3. We now need to derive conﬁdence intervals for the estimated values to formally
compare the theoretical and the estimated breaking points. We approximate the distribution
of the structural breaks through a bootstrap procedure. For each demand (fourteen cases) and
R-E (nine) assumptions, we extract 99 random subsamples of 1,020 observations stratiﬁed for α
(we use twenty observations for each α out of the ﬁfty available). We use Deﬁnition 2 to obtain
the sub-samples’ structural breaking points.
In Figure 5, we represent the mean (squares) and the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the struc-
tural breaking points. Also in the same ﬁgure, we present the theoretical switching points
(diamonds), as described in Table 2. Each panel corresponds to one R-E combination and for
each panel we represent the simulated and theoretical breaking points (vertical axis) for each
level of demand (horizontal axis). Theoretical thresholds and simulation breaking points co-
move following an inverted-V shape: they increase when the change is from one to zero pivotal
players, and decrease when we move from one to two pivotal players. Conﬁdence intervals are
narrow in general.17 Overall, the ﬁt between the close-form and (endogenously obtained) sim-
u l a t e dr e s u l t si sv e r yg o o d . O u to f126 comparisons, only 3 theoretical switching points fall
outside the conﬁdence intervals and 123 fall inside. That leads us to the following stylised fact:
11. There is strong correspondence between simulated breaking points and analytically
derived switching points.
3.4 Diversiﬁcation and latent intensity of competition
In the simulation environment it is possible to inspect the probability priors from which bids
are chosen. It is therefore possible to study how market structures (excess demand, generation
diversiﬁcation, etc.) inﬂuence the ﬁrms’ “competitive attitude” and not only market outcomes.18
17B r e a k i n gp o i n t sa r em o r ed i ﬃcult to identify for ¯ Q =2 3 0 , ¯ Q =2 4 0 ,a n d ¯ Q =2 9 0 .T h a tm i g h t ,i np a r t ,b e
due to the location of the corresponding αt in the extremes. For ¯ Q =2 3 0and ¯ Q = 240 one has αt =0 .47,w h i c h
in the estimation would correspond to a linear model for all observations in α<0.47 and a second regime for
only α = {.48,.49}. Similarly, for ¯ Q =2 9 0we have αt =0 .07, and there is one regime for α<0.7 and another
for α ≥ 0.7.T h eﬂexibility in the two-regime model is thus less present in those cases.
18We have also analysed latent competition intensities in Rupérez Micola and Bunn (forthcoming) and Rupérez
Micola et al. (forthcoming).
14Through their trading interaction and the R-E algorithm, ﬁrms learn to prioritise those bidding
strategies that achieve higher payoﬀs and choose them more often. Price regularities follow once
marginal supply patterns are established.
The panels in Figure 6 depict the end-of-simulation individual latent probability distributions
from which ﬁrms choose bids. On the horizontal axes, strategies are identiﬁed with numbers
ranging from 1 for the more competitive to 100 for the highest possible bid. Cumulative probabil-
ities are calculated on the vertical axes for each element of the action space. The concentration
of probabilities is largely invariant across a large number of periods once the market reaches
convergence, so the distributions on the last trading period are an indication of the plants’ long-
term mixed strategies. Probabilities concentrated on lower and higher actions result on the
plants bidding more and less competitively, respectively, and curve movements to the upper-left
and lower-right corners suggest that the market becomes more and less competitive.
The curves summarise end-of-simulation cumulative bidding probabilities under ¯ Q = 180,
and ¯ Q =2 8 0for specialisation (α =0 ), diversiﬁcation (α =0 .5) and at the breaking points
(αt =0 .20 and αt =0 .13, respectively, see Table 2), averaged across the 50 simulation runs for
δ =0 .5 and γ =0 .005.
Figure 6 oﬀers a number of general insights linking individual probability distributions to
market outcomes. Base-load plants trade more competitively than peak-load plants. Under
α =0 , Firm 1 and Firm 2’s bids are very diﬀerent - lower for the base-load specialist. However,
when α =0 .50, bidding priors for each plant type are very similar but diﬀerent across plant type.
Thus, there is a clear identiﬁcation between generation technology and the competitiveness of
the plant’s trading prior.
Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence suggesting a link between portfolio diversiﬁcation, learning, trad-
ing behaviour and market outcomes. For a given α, a demand increase from ¯ Q = 180 to ¯ Q = 280
has the eﬀect of making the bids less competitive (i.e. lower right movements). Moreover, trad-
ing priors shift in the competitive direction (upper left) when diversiﬁcation grows from α =0
to αt with resulting lower bids and, hence, market prices. However, when the movement is from
αt to α =0 .5, the curves move to the lower-right corner, which suggests a less competitive
attitude, with resulting higher prices.
3.5 Plant size and diversiﬁcation
Our portfolio conﬁgurations do not vary only in terms of their degree of diversiﬁcation but also
i nt h es i z eo ft h ep o w e rp l a n t sa s s i g n e dt oe a c hﬁrm. It is fair to ask to what extent the two
15eﬀects interact. To answer this question, we run new simulations with marginal costs equal to
zero for all plants. Figures 7a, 7b and 7c provide the market price diﬀerence in the representative
cases ( ¯ Q = {240,180,280}) between the main simulations, i.e. under technological diversiﬁcation
(diﬀerent marginal costs), and those with diﬀerent plant sizes but only one technology, i.e. where
marginal costs are zero for all plants. The ﬁgures, thus, separate the plant size and technological
aspects.
The diﬀerence attributable to technology diversiﬁcation is positive throughout. Moreover,
the relationship between α and prices presents a visually identiﬁable kink at the pivotal dy-
namics’ switching point (αt =0 .40,0.20,0.13 for ¯ Q = 240,180,280, respectively). In all cases,
the eﬀect of technology diversiﬁcation is stronger before the switching point. After a drop
at the switching point, the eﬀect remains stable in the intermediate and tight demand condi-
tions ( ¯ Q = {240,280}) but is reduced even further as α increases in the case of spare capacity
( ¯ Q = {180}). In short, technology diversiﬁcation causes an additional change in the price
dynamics, which comes on top of plant size eﬀects.
4 Discussion
We study the relationship between the degree of diversiﬁcation in electricity generation portfolios
and the ﬁrms’ ability and incentives to inﬂuence prices. The setting, a version of von der Fehr and
Harbord’s (1993) electricity market, describes some aspects of energy trading well but includes a
very large number of non-Pareto ranked pure strategy equilibria. Thus, computational learning
algorithms oﬀer a number of conceptual and practical advantages for economic analysis. We
choose the R-E inductive equilibrium selection algorithm and, rather than focusing on pure
specialisation and diversiﬁcation, we also analyse a wide range of intermediate combinations.
Our main research question concerns the shape of the diversiﬁcation versus market price
relationship. The simulations suggest that this is often decreasing, but that demand levels
inﬂuence both its shape and the price levels. The relationship is not monotonic but it includes
structural stability breaks. For a wide range of parameters, we have also identiﬁed a strong
correspondence between close-form switching points and those endogenously obtained in the
simulations.
It is well-known that a market where generators are specialised can exhibit more market
power because its price-setting players are more concentrated. However, specialised high cost
generators have less incentive to exert market power because they lack base-load plants. In con-
16trast, diversiﬁed ﬁrms have the incentives, but may not have enough price-setting capacity. Our
research contributes to clarify the inﬂuence of generation technologies with a characterisation of
the role played by pivotal players. The composition of a ﬁrm’s generation portfolio is a market
power instrument because it modiﬁes pivotal dynamics and changes the intensity of competi-
tion. A ﬁrms’ ability to inﬂuence the market price grows with its size and position in the supply
stack. Pivotal players have more market power than non-pivotal. In low-demand cases, there
is a regime-switching point of the diversiﬁcation level where the market moves from one to no
pivotal plants. At that point, the formerly pivotal plant suﬀers a sudden loss of market power
and prices drop. In high-demand cases, there is a regime-switching point where the market
setting changes from one to two pivotal players. As a result, the new pivotal plant experiences
a sudden increase in its degree of market power, which is not compensated by a decrease in the
previously unique pivotal plant’s market power. More balanced bargaining power between the
two peak-load plants then facilitates some implicit cooperation and prices increase.
Although the results are stylised and do not scale up directly to any particular real world
situation, they suggest a number of general policy implications. In demand/supply situations
which are usual in Western energy markets (around 20% excess capacity), the relationship be-
tween diversiﬁc a t i o na n dp r i c e si sV - s h a p e di nd u o p o l y .W i t hs o m ed i v e r s i ﬁcation, competition
at the margin leads to lower prices until prices increase at the pivotal threshold. Under perfect
diversiﬁcation, all generators hold the same technological portfolio and bidding coordination
opportunities are highest. Prices are then higher than in the intermediate cases, but lower than
under specialisation.
Our results might also help explain some features of the electricity time-series, e.g. high
volatility and seasonality. Low- and high-demand periods might not only lead to more or less
supply competition but also change its nature. When demand is low there are no pivotal plants
but in high-demand cases there are two of them. Since electricity demand is extremely price
inelastic and a function of temperature, exogenous weather patterns might explain changes in the
ﬁrms’ trading behaviour, which in turn might contribute to cause the dramatic regime switching
observed in econometric studies of electricity prices (for example, Karakatsani and Bunn, 2004).
Our results, however, rely on a number of assumptions. First, they stem from the R-E
algorithm, which is only one of the models one could use. R-E reinforcement learning is shown
to be a fruitful alternative where standard theoretical methods are impractical. Moreover, where
there are unique theoretical predictions (e.g. switching points, von der Fehr and Harbord’s
(1993) predictions for high and low demand/supply ratios), R-E simulations match them well.
17Moreover, our robustness tests suggest that diﬀerent R-E versions do not qualitatively change
our conclusions. However, it might also be possible to use a diﬀerent behavioural model, given
that related algorithms also perform well against theoretical predictions (e.g. Day and Bunn,
1999; García et al., 2005). Moreover, R-E simulation agents are naive, and one might expect
that experimental studies will yield outcomes more predictive of real-life electricity markets.
Hence, our quantitative results should be taken as indicators of the direction and relative
importance of the eﬀects, rather than of their magnitude. Second, the various simulation pa-
rameters — including number of ﬁrms, technology stocks, etc.— were deﬁned as exogenous and
independent of one another. It is possible that in real markets they would be endogenously de-
termined and simulations might also contribute to study their reciprocal dynamics, as in Bunn
and Oliveira (2007). Here, we have focused on a stylised, relatively standard market model,
whose outcomes are more directly comparable to those of close-form approaches.
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Figure 7c: Difference of prices high-cost=100 minus high cost=0(Q=280)
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